The Obama administration's efforts to counter the threat posed by al Qaeda
and the wider jihadist movement have been a contentious topic in the U.S.
presidential race. Political rhetoric abounds on both sides; administration
officials claim that al Qaeda has been seriously crippled, while some critics
of the administration allege that the group is stronger than ever. As with most
political rhetoric, both claims bear elements of truth, but the truth depends
largely on how al Qaeda and jihadism are defined. Unfortunately, politicians
and the media tend to define al Qaeda loosely and incorrectly.
The jihadist threat will persist regardless of who is elected president, so
understanding the actors involved is critical. But a true understanding of
those actors requires taxonomical acuity. It seems worthwhile, then, to revisit
wingrass's definitions of al Qaeda and the wider jihadist movement.
A Network of Networks
Al Qaeda, the group established by Osama bin Laden and his colleagues, was
never very large -- there were never more than a few hundred actual members. We
often refer to this group, now led by Ayman al-Zawahiri, as the al Qaeda core
or al Qaeda prime. While the group's founders trained tens of thousands of men
at their camps in Afghanistan and Sudan, they initially viewed themselves as a
vanguard organization working with kindred groups to facilitate the jihad they
believed was necessary to establish a global Islamic caliphate. Most of the men
trained at al Qaeda camps were members of other organizations or were
grassroots jihadists. The majority of them received basic paramilitary training,
and only a select few were invited to receive additional training in terrorist
tradecraft skills such as surveillance, document forgery and bombmaking. Of
this select group, only a few men were invited to join the al Qaeda core
organization.
Bin Laden envisioned another purpose for al Qaeda: leading the charge
against corrupt rulers in the Muslim world and against the United States, which
he believed supported corrupt Muslim rulers. Al Qaeda sought to excise the
United States from the Muslim world in much the same way that Hezbollah drove
U.S. forces out of Lebanon and Somalia forced the U.S. withdrawal from
Mogadishu.
Al Qaeda became a network of networks -- a trait demonstrated not only by
its training methods but also in bin Laden's rhetoric. For example, bin Laden's
1998 "World Islamic Front" statement, which declared jihad against
Jews and Crusaders, was signed by al-Zawahiri (who at the time was leading the
Egyptian Islamic Jihad) and leaders of other groups, including the Egyptian
Islamic Group, Jamiat-ul-Ulema-e-Pakistan and the Jihad Movement of Bangladesh.
Following the 9/11 attacks, the United States applied against the al Qaeda
core the full pressure of its five counterterrorism levers: intelligence,
military, law enforcement, diplomacy and financial sanctions. As a result, many
al Qaeda members, eventually including bin Laden, were captured or killed and
their assets were frozen. Such measures have ensured that the group remains
small for operational security concerns. The remaining members of the group
mostly are lying low in Pakistan near the Afghan border, and their isolation
there has severely degraded their ability to conduct attacks. The al Qaeda core
is now relegated to producing propaganda for guidance and inspiration for other
jihadist elements. Despite the disproportionate amount of media attention given
to statements from al-Zawahiri and Adam Gadahn, the al Qaeda core constitutes
only a very small part of the larger jihadist movement. In fact, it has not
conducted a successful terrorist attack in years.
However, the core group has not been destroyed. It could regenerate if the
United States eased its pressure, but we believe that will be difficult given
the loss of the charismatic bin Laden and his replacement by the irascible
al-Zawahiri.
In any case, the jihadist movement transcends the al Qaeda core. In fact,
wingrass for years published an annual forecast of al Qaeda, but beginning in
2009, we intentionally changed the title of the forecast to reflect the
isolation and marginalization of the al Qaeda core and the ascendance of other
jihadist actors. We believed our analysis needed to focus less on the al Qaeda
core and more on the truly active and significant elements of the jihadist
movement, including regional groups that have adopted the al Qaeda name and the
array of grassroots jihadists.
Franchises and Grassroots
An element of the jihadist movement that is often loosely referred to as al
Qaeda is the worldwide network of local or regional militant groups that have
assumed al Qaeda's name or ideology. In many cases, the relationships between
the leadership of these groups and the al Qaeda core began in the 1980s and
1990s.
Some groups have publicly claimed allegiance to the al Qaeda core, becoming
what we refer to as franchise groups. These groups include al Qaeda in Iraq, al
Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb and al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula. Even though
these franchises bear the al Qaeda name, they are locally owned and operated.
This means that the local commanders have significant latitude in how closely
they follow the guidance and philosophy of the al Qaeda core.
Some franchise group leaders, such as AQAP's Nasir al-Wahayshi, maintain
strong relationships with the al Qaeda core and are very closely aligned with
the core's philosophy. Other leaders, such as Abu Musab Abd al-Wadoud of AQIM,
are more distanced. In fact, AQIM has seen severe internal fighting over these
doctrinal issues, and several former leaders of Algeria's Salafist Group for
Preaching and Combat left the group because of this conflict. Further, it is
widely believed that the death of Somali al Qaeda leader Fazul Abdullah
Mohammed was arranged by leaders of Somali jihadist group al Shabaab, which he
had criticized sharply.
The last and broadest element of the global jihadist movement often
referred to as al Qaeda is what wingrass refers to as grassroots jihadists.
These are individuals or small cells of individuals that are inspired by the al
Qaeda core -- or increasingly, by its franchise groups -- but that may have
little or no actual connection to these groups. Some grassroots jihadists
travel to places such as Pakistan or Yemen to receive training from the
franchise groups. Other grassroots militants have no direct contact with other
jihadist elements.
The core, the franchises and the grassroots jihadists are often
interchangeably referred to as al Qaeda, but there are important differences
among these actors that need to be recognized.
Important Distinctions
There are some other important distinctions that inform our terminology and
our analysis. Not all jihadists are linked to al Qaeda, and not all militant
Islamists are jihadists. Islamists are those who believe society is best
governed by Islamic law, or Sharia. Militant Islamists are those who advocate
the use of force to establish Sharia. Militant Islamists are found in both
Islamic sects. Al Qaeda is a Sunni militant Islamist group, but Hezbollah is a
Shiite militant Islamist group. Moreover, not all militant Muslims are
Islamists. Some take up arms for tribal, territorial, ethnic or nationalistic
reasons, or for a combination of reasons.
In places such as Iraq, Afghanistan, Yemen, Libya and northern Mali,
several militant groups are fighting foreign forces, their government or each
other -- and sometimes all of the above. Some of these groups are jihadists,
some are tribal militias, some are brigands and smugglers, and others are
nationalists. Identifying, sorting and classifying these groups can be very difficult,
and sometimes alliances shift or overlap. For example, Yemen's southern
separatists will sometimes work with tribal militias or AQAP to fight against
the government; other times, they fight against these would-be allies. We have
seen similar dynamics in northern Mali among groups such as AQIM, Ansar Dine,
the Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa, various Tuareg groups and
other tribal militias in the region.
Taxonomy becomes even more difficult when a group uses multiple names, or
when multiple groups share a name. Groups adopt different names for discretion,
confusion or public relations purposes. AQAP called itself Ansar al-Shariah
during its fight to take over cities in southern Yemen and to govern the
territory. But radical cleric Abu Hamza al-Masri, who was arrested in the
United Kingdom in 2004 and extradited to the United States in 2012, has long
led a movement likewise called Ansar al-Shariah. Even the Libyan jihadist
militia that attacked the U.S. Consulate in Benghazi uses the same name. But
just because these groups share a name, and just because members or leaders of
the groups know each other, does not necessarily mean that they are chapters of
the same group or network of groups, or that they even subscribe to the same
ideology.
As we mentioned long before Moammar Gadhafi was ousted in Libya, jihadists
and other militants thrive in power vacuums. This assertion has proved true in
Afghanistan, Iraq and Somalia, and more recently in Libya, northern Mali and
now Syria. Weapons flooding into such regions only compound the problem.
Militant Islamists have seized the opportunity to grow in influence in such
places, as have the subset of militant Islamists we call jihadists. So in this
context, while the al Qaeda core has been crippled, other portions of the
jihadist movement are thriving. This is especially so among those that aspire
to mount local insurgencies rather than those more concerned with planning
transnational attacks. The nuances are important because as the composition and
objectives of jihadist groups change, so do their methods of attack.
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