|
|
Stratfor
By George
Friedman
Russian
President Vladimir Putin arrived in Israel on June 25 for his first state
visit since retaking the presidency. The visit was arranged in mid-May, and so
at least part of the agenda was set, given events in Syria and Egypt. The
interesting thing about Israel and Russia is that while they seem to be
operating in the same areas of interest and their agendas seem disconnected,
their interests are not always opposed. It is easy to identify places they both
care about but more difficult to identify ways in which they connect. It is
therefore difficult to identify the significance of the visit beyond that it
happened.
An example
is Azerbaijan. Russia is still a major weapons provider for Azerbaijan, but the
Israelis are now selling it large amounts of weapons and appear to be using it
as a base from which to observe and, according to rumors, possibly attack Iran.
Russia, which supports Armenia, a country Azerbaijan fought a war with in
the late 1980s and early 1990s and technically still is at war
with, ought to oppose Israel's action, particularly since it threatens
Iran, which Russia does not want attacked. At the same time, Russia doesn't
feel threatened by Israeli involvement in Azerbaijan, and Israel doesn't really
care about Armenia. Both are there, both are involved and both think Azerbaijan
is important, yet each operates in ways that ought to conflict but don't.
The same is
true in the more immediate case of Syria, where its downing of a Turkish plane
has created an unexpected dynamic for this visit. To think about this we need
to consider Russian and Israeli strategy and its odd lack of intersection in
Syria.
Russia's Need for a U.S. Distraction
Russia has
complex relationships in the region, particularly focused on Syria and Iran.
Russia's interest in both countries is understandable. Putin, who has said he
regarded the breakup of the Soviet Union as a geopolitical catastrophe, views
the United States as Russia's prime adversary. His view is that the United
States not only used the breakup to extend NATO into the former Soviet Union in
the Baltics but also has tried to surround and contain Russia by supporting
pro-democracy movements in the region and by using these movements to create
pro-American governments. Putin sees himself as being in a duel with the United
States throughout the former Soviet Union.
The Russians
believe they are winning this struggle. Putin is not so much interested in
dominating these countries as he is in being certain that the United States
doesn't dominate them. That gives Russia room to maneuver and allows it to
establish economic and political relations that secure Russian interests. In
addition, Russia has tremendously benefited from the U.S. wars in the Islamic
world. It is not so much that these wars alienated Muslims, although that was
beneficial. Rather, what helped the Russians most was that these wars absorbed
American strategic bandwidth.
Obviously,
U.S. military and intelligence capabilities that might have been tasked to
support movements and regimes in Russia's "near abroad" were absorbed
by conflict in the Islamic world. But perhaps even more important, the
strategic and intellectual bandwidth of U.S. policymakers was diverted. Russia
became a secondary strategic interest after 9/11. While some movements already
in place were supported by the United States, this was mostly inertia, and as
the Russians parried and movements in various countries splintered, the United
States did not have resources to respond.
The Russians
also helped keep the United States tied up in Afghanistan by facilitating bases
in Central Asia and providing a corridor for resupply. Russia was able to
create a new reality in the region in which it was the dominant power, without
challenge.
The Russians
therefore valued the conflict in the Middle East because it allowed Russia to
be a secondary issue for the only global power. With the war in Iraq over and
the war in Afghanistan ending, the possibility is growing that the United
States would have the resources and bandwidth to resume the duel on the Russian
periphery. This is not in the Russian interest. Therefore, the Russians have an
interest in encouraging any process that continues to draw the United States
into the Islamic world. Chief among these is supporting Iran and Syria. To be
more precise, Russia does not so much support these countries as it opposes
measures that might either weaken Iran or undermine the Syrian government. From
the Russian point of view, the simple existence of these regimes provides a
magnet that diverts U.S. power.
Israel's Position on Syria
This brings
us back to Putin's visit to Israel. From the Russian point of view, Syria is
not a side issue but a significant part of its strategy. Israel has more
complex feelings. The regime of Syrian President Bashar al Assad, while the
Soviets were allied with it, represented a significant danger to Israel. With
the fall of the Soviet Union, Syria lost its patron and diminished as a threat.
Since then, the Syrians under al Assad had two virtues from the
Israeli point of view. The first was that they were predictable. Their
interests in Lebanon were built around financial and political goals that could
be accommodated by the Israelis in exchange for limitations on the sorts of
military activity that Israel could not tolerate. Furthermore, Syria's
interests did not include conflict with Israel, and therefore Syria held
Hezbollah in check until it was forced out of Lebanon by the United States in
2005.
The second
advantage of the al Assad regime in relation to Israel was that it was not
Sunni but Alawite, a Shiite sect. During the 2000s, Israel and the West
believed the main threat emanated from the Sunni world. Al Qaeda, the Muslim
Brotherhood and Hamas were all Sunni. Over the past decade, a corrupt minority
Alawite regime has appeared preferable to Israel than a coherent majority
radical Islamist regime in the north. It wasn't certain how radical it
would be, but at the same time there appeared to be more risk on the Sunni side
than on the Shiite side.
Israel's
position on the al Assad regime has shifted in the past year from hoping it
would survive to accepting that it couldn't and preparing for the next regime.
Underlying this calculus was a reconsideration of which regime would be more
dangerous. With the withdrawal of the United States from Iraq and with Iran
filling the vacuum that was left, Iran became a greater threat to Israel than
Hamas and the Sunnis. Therefore, Israel now desires a Sunni regime in Syria
that would block Iranian ambitions.
In this
sense, Israeli and Russian interests continue to diverge. At the same time, the
Israelis are aware that they have very little influence over what happens in
Syria. They are bystanders hoping that things work out for them. Whether they
favor this or that faction in Syria matters little. Indeed, open Israeli
support for any faction can hurt that side. Therefore, Syria is a
demonstration of the limits of Israeli power. What happens in Syria matters a
great deal, but Israel lacks the power and influence to have an impact.
Coinciding Interests
The Russians
do have some power and influence. The weapons they supply to the Syrian
government can help the regime survive. Their ability to block or
circumvent sanctions helps both Iran and Syria. Russia cannot impose a
solution, but it may be able to create the circumstances under which the United
States is drawn in and diverted. At the same time, it must be remembered that
Russia has its own problem with Islamic in the northern Caucasus. These groups
are mostly Sunni, but there are a wide variety of Sunnis. While the Russians
want to prevent a radical Sunni group in Syria, they could on this level live
with a more moderate Sunni group if they cannot keep al Assad or his regime in
power.
Putin's
visit is intended to make the United States nervous and to try to lay the
groundwork for shifts in Israel's relation to Russia that could pay off in the
long run. The Israelis, however, do have things they need from Putin. They
cannot control regime change in Syria, but to some extent Russia can. And here
Israeli and Russian interests coincide. Israel would tolerate the survival of
the al Assad regime as long as Syria does not become an Iranian
satellite.
Russia could
counterbalance Iran if al Assad's regime survived. If, on the other hand, his
regime fell, Israel and Russia both have an interest in a moderate Sunni
regime. This is where Russia must make a decision -- assuming it has the power
to affect the outcome. In the long run, a moderate Sunni regime is in its
interest. In the short run, it wants a regime that creates the greatest unease
for the United States -- that is, either the al Assad regime as an Iranian
asset or a radical Islamist regime.
There is a
point where all this comes together. Turkey has decided, in response to the
downing of its aircraft, to call a meeting of NATO. Turkey is not prepared to
unilaterally intervene in Syria, but having lost an aircraft it could ask for a
NATO intervention of some sort. Turkey has been hostile to al Assad from early
on, and this gives it the opportunity to invoke the alliance under its common
defense policy.
How NATO
will respond is unknown, save that the rhetoric will be intense and the desire
for combat restrained. Neither Russia nor Israel would be upset by a NATO
intervention. From the Russian point of view, a NATO intervention involving
large amounts of U.S. forces would be the best it could hope for, especially if
NATO gets bogged down, as tends to happen in such interventions. From the
Israeli point of view, having NATO take responsibility for Syria would be the
best possible outcome by far.
Of course,
this was not on the table when the Israeli-Russian meeting was set up. At that
time, the meeting was meant to explore the differences on subjects such as
Syria. But with recent events, the benefits of possible NATO involvement,
however unlikely, are something that Russia and Israel agree on. Of course,
neither is a member of NATO, and getting any NATO country to commit troops to
Syria is unlikely. But what was likely to be a pointless discussion now has some
point.
Israel would
like Russia as a mild counterweight to the United States but without disrupting
relations with the United States. Russia would like to have additional options
in the Middle East beyond Iran and Syria but without alienating those states. Neither
is likely. When we dig into the strange relationship between two countries
deeply involved in each other's areas of interest yet never quite intersecting,
an answer begins to emerge.
There is
little conflict between Russia's and Israel's interests because neither country
is nearly as powerful as it would like to be in the region. Russia has some
options but nothing like it had during the Cold War. Israel has little
influence in the outcome in Syria or in Egypt.
Still, it is
in the interest of both countries to make themselves appear to be weightier
than they are. A state visit should help serve that purpose.
No comments:
Post a Comment