RULES OF INTERPRETATION AND CONSTRUCTION OF STATUTES AND DOCUMENTS, MAXIMS USED IN CONSTRUCTION

DRAFTING – RULES OF INTERPRETATION AND CONSTRUCTION OF STATUTES AND DOCUMENTS; MAXIMS USED IN CONSTRUCTION GOLDEN RULE

This is the principle that in construing written instruments, a court should adhere to the grammatical and ordinary sense of the words unless that adherence would lead to some manifest absurdity; especially in statutory construction, thus, it is the principle that if a statute’s literal meaning would lead to an absurd or unjust result, or even to an inconsistency within the statute itself, the statute should be interpreted in such a way that avoids such a result or inconsistency. Rupert Cross in “Statutory Interpretation” page 14 (1976) held thus: “The golden rule… allows for a departure from the literal rule when the application of the statutory words in the ordinary sense would be repugnant to or inconsistent with some other provision in the statute or even when it would lead to what the court considers to be an absurdity. The usual consequence of applying the golden rule is that words which are in the statute are ignored or words which are not there are read in. The scope of the golden rule is debatable, particularly so far as the meaning of an ‘absurdity’ is concerned”. Thus, it is a basic principle which should always be followed – Grey v. Pearson (1857) 10 E. R. 1216; Mitchell v. Torrup (1766) Park 227; Bronik Motors v. Wema Bank (1983) L.S.C.L.R. 296; Lee v. Knapp (1967) 2 QBD 442. Onyewu v. K. S. M (2003) 10 NWLR (Pt 827) 40. LITERAL RULE This is also termed strict constructionism which is the doctrinal view of judicial construction holding that the judges should interpret a document of statute (especially one involving penal sanctions) according to its literal terms, without looking to other sources to ascertain the meaning – R. v. Commissioner of Income Tax (1888) 22 Q. B. S. 296; Bronik Motors v. Wema Bank (1983) L.S.C.L.R. 296; Awolowo v. Shagari (1979) 6-9 S.C. 51; Toriola v. Williams (1982) 7S. C. 27; R v. Bangaza (1960) 5 FSC 1; Ndoma Egba v. Chukwuogor (2004) FWLR (Pt. 217) 735; Ekeogu v. Aliri (1991) 3 NWLR (Pt. 179) 258; Ojukwu v. Obasanjo (2004) FWLR (pt 222) 1666. MISCHIEF RULE In statutory construction, the doctrine that a statute should be interpreted by first identifying the problem (or ‘mischief’) that the statute was designed to remedy and then adopting a constitution that will suppress the problem the remedy – Heydon's case (1584) 3 C. Rep. 7a; Smith v. Hughes (1960) 1 W.L.R. 830; Savannah Bank v. Ajilo (1989) 1 NWLR (Pt 97) 305; Wilson v. Attorney-General, Bendel State (1985) 1 NWLR (Pt 4) 573; National Assembly v. President (2003) 9 NWLR (Pt 824) 104. EJUSDEM GENERIS This means ‘of the same kind or class’. A canon of construction that when a general word or phrase follows a list of specific persons or things, the general word or phrase will be interpreted to include only persons or things of the same type as those listed – Campbell v. Board of Dental Examiners 53 Cal. App. 3d 283, 125 Cal. Rptr. 694, 696. Thus, the class first mentioned is to be taken as the most comprehensive and the general words as referring to matter ejusdem generis with such class – Tiumanns and Co. v. S. S. Knutsford Co. (1908) 2 K.B; (1908) A.C. 14, or ports if it was in the opinion of the master unsafe to do so "in consequence for war, disturbance or any other cause". The question arose whether a port inaccessible in the opinion of the master through ice was within the exception. It was held not to be so any other cause "must" be construed to apply to cause ejusdem generis or similar to "war" disturbance"; Jammal Steel Structure v. A. C. B. (1973) All NLR 823; F. R. N v. Ifegwu (2003) 15 NWLR (Pt 842) 113; Ojukwu v. Obasanjo (2004) FWLR (Pt 222) 1666. BENEFICIAL CONSTRUCTION In construing a statute, the words must not be so strained as to include cases plainly omitted from the natural meaning of the language. Accordingly, a statute requiring that public house must be dosed at certain hours on Sunday should not be" so construed as to extend it to Christmas Day – Forsdike v. Colquhoun (1883) 112 B.D.71; Savannah Bank v. Ajilo (supra). PURPOSIVE RULE OF INTERPRETATION This approach is developed from the use of the" Purpose clause" and commonly found in statutes. The purpose clause may help the reader interpret the statute in case of any uncertainty in the statute – PDP v. INEC (1999) 11 NWLR (Pt. 626) 200; Pepper (Inspector of taxes) v. Hart (1993) All ER 42; Omoijahe v. Umoru (1999) 8 NWLR (pt 614) 188. UT RES MAGI VALEAT QUAM PEREAT In circumstances where alternative constructions are equally open, that alternative which is consistent with the smooth working of the system is to be chosen which the statute purports to be regulating and that alternative is to be rejected which would introduce uncertainty, friction or confusion into the working of the system"; Shanon Realties Limited v. Villede St. Michael (1924) A.C. 185 per Lord Shaw at page 192 – 193. This is apparent in the construction of the constitution – Nafiu Rabiu v. The State. GENERALIBUS SPECIALIA DEROGANT/GENERALIA SPECIALIBUS NON DEROGANT This is one of the exceptions to the ejusdem generis rule. It means a word that has a general meaning cannot derogate from a specific provision meaning – Shroeder v. Major (1989) 2 NWLR (Pt. 101) 1; Attorney-General, Ondo State v. Attorney-General (Federation) (2002) 9 NWLR (Pt. 772) 222; M.V. Panormous Bay v. Olam (Nig) Ltd (2004) 5 NWLR (Pt 865) 1 EXPRESSIO UNIUS EST EXCLUSIO ALTERIUS What is stated in statute expressly excludes that which is not stated in statute. Therefore one does not import into a statute that which it is not meant to govern. Attorney-General (Federation) v. Aideyan; Ogbuniya v. Okudo (1976) 6-9 SC 32; PDP v. INEC (Supra); Osahon v. FRN (2003) 16 NWLR (845) 89. LEX NON COGIT IMPOSSIBILIA This legal maxim means that the law should not command an impossibility – Ohuka v. State (1988) 1 NWLR (pt 72) 1 CONTRA PROFERENTUM This means against the offeror. It is the doctrine that, in interpreting documents, ambiguities are to be construed unfavourably. Thus, it is where a particular contract is construed strictly against the interest maker of the particular provision in that document and in favour of the other party. CONTEMPT OF COURT A contempt of court is an action or inaction amounting to an interference with or having a tendency to interfere with the administration of justice. Thus, it is any act which is calculated to embarrass, hinder, or obstruct court in administration of justice, or which is calculated to lessen its authority or its dignity. It is also any conduct which tends to bring into disrespect, scorn or disrepute the authority and administration of the law. Or which tends to interfere with and/or prejudice litigants and/or their witnesses in the course of litigation – Awobokun v. Toun Adeyemi (1968) NMLR 289. In Franklin O. Atake V. Attorney General (Federation) & Anor (1982) 11 SC 175. Idigbe, JSC stated thus: "It is indeed difficult to give exact definition of contempt of court and this is because it is so manifold in aspects but generally it may be described as any conduct which tend to bring into disrespect, scorn or disrepute the authority and administration of the law or which tends to interfere with and or prejudice litigants and/or their witnesses in the course of litigation." Also, in Theophilus Adetola Awobokun & Anor v. Toun Adeyemi (1968) NMLR 289. The Court defined contempt of court as follows: "The essence of contempt is action or inaction amounting to an interference with or obstruction or having a tendency to interfere with or obstruct due administration of justice." It should however be noted that it is committed by a person who does any act in willful contravention of its authority or dignity, or tending to impede or frustrate the administration of justice, or by one who, being under the court’s authority as a party to a preceding therein willfully disobeys its lawful orders or fails to comply with an undertaking which he had given. Follow @wingrassnews