Sentence is the last stage of the trial. If the court
finds the accused guilty, it should either pass sentence on him or make an
order – section 248 of the CPA, and
the court may adjourn the case to some future day for this purpose.
For every distinct count of which the accused is
convicted in a separate sentence should be imposed – Adesina v. Police (1956) 1 FSC 55,
and until a sentence is passed, the trial of court of count has in
effect not been completed by the court. So where the trial judge found the accused
guilty on certain counts in the charge but failed to pass any sentence on any
of these counts, the Supreme Court declined to uphold the convictions – Aigbe
7 Anor. v. The State (1976) 1 NMLR 184. If the sentence imposed for the
distinct counts are imprisonment, they may be ordered to run currently.
The sentence which is passed must be recorded in the
record of proceedings – Okpo v. The State (1972) 2 SC 26. A
judge sitting at an Assizes (that is, a session of a court), may at any time
during the same Assizes or Session, before a sentence passed him has been
entered on the record, alter that sentence and substitute it for another – Oyediran
& Ors. v. The Republic (1967) NMLR
122. Thereafter, that is, after the end of the Assizes or Session, he
may not alter the sentence for he is functus
officio, although in a proper case a Court of Appeal may reverse or amend
the sentence.
POWER
TO CONVICT FOR AN OFFENCE NOT EXPRESSLY CHARGED
As a general rule, an accused can only be found guilty
in respect of the offence for which he is charged, that is, the offence to
which he has pleaded not guilty, and in respect of which the onus is on the
prosecution to establish the charge beyond reasonable doubt.
There are however provisions in the principal
enactments which permit a magistrate or a judge to convict for such kindred
offence for which the accused was not arraigned before the court, if the
evidence adduced at the trial shows that the accused person committed an
offence other than the offence charged. The justification for empowering the
courts to convict an accused for offence not expressly charged has been stated
as one of public policy in order to bring litigation to finality – Babalola
v. The State (1989) 4 NWLR (Pt. 115) 264 at 285.
A judge or a magistrate can convict an accused person
for an offence not expressly charged in the following circumstances –
1.
Where an accused is charged
with a substantive or full offence, but the evidence establishes an attempt to
commit the substantive or full offence, he may be convicted of the attempt,
although the attempt was not expressly charged – section 169 of the CPA; section 219 of the CPC.
2.
Where an accused is charged
with stealing, but the evidence established that he received the thing allegedly
stolen knowing the same to have been stolen, he may be convicted for receiving
stolen property – section 173 of the
CPA.
3.
Where an accused is charged
with any of the following offences – burglary, housebreaking, entering into a
dwelling house, breaking into a building and committing a felony therein,
breaking into a building with intent to commit a felony therein, breaking into
a place of worship with intent to commit a felony. The accused may be convicted
of any of these offences, if established by evidence, other than the offence
charged – section 174(1) of the CPA.
4.
Where an accused is charged
with stealing and the evidence established the offence of obtaining property by
false pretences with intent to defraud, he may be convicted of obtaining
property by false pretences with intent to defraud – section 174(2) of the CPA.
5.
Where an accused is charged
with obtaining property by false pretences with intent to defraud, and the
evidence established the offence of stealing, he may be convicted of stealing –
section 174(3) of the CPA.
6.
Where an accused is charged
with the offence of rape or defilement of a girl under the age of 11, and the
evidence revealed an offence of unlawful carnal knowledge of an imbecile or an
idiot or of the offence of indecent assault, he may be convicted of any such
offence – section 175 of the CPA.
7.
Where an accused is charged
with the murder of any child or of infanticide, and the evidence establishes
the offence of concealment of birth of a child, he may be convicted of the
offence of concealment of birth of a child – section 177 of the CPA.
8.
Where an accused is charged for
the murder of her newly born child, and the evidence revealed the offence of
infanticide, manslaughter or concealment of birth, she may be convicted of any
such offence – section 178 of the CPA.
9.
Where an accused is charged
with an offence, and there is a doubt as to which particular offence was
committed by the accused, he may be convicted of any offence, other than the
offence with which he was charged, if it appears from the evidence that he committed
that offence – section 217 of the CPA.
10.
Where an accused is charged
with a grave offence, he may be convicted of a lesser offence, where the
offence charged consists of several particulars and a combination of some of
the particulars constitutes a complete lesser offence, and if the lesser
offence is proved by the evidence adduced and the remaining particulars are not
proved – section 179(1) of the CPA;
section 218 of the CPC.
11.
Where an accused is charged
with an offence, and facts proved which reduce it to a lesser offence, he may
be convicted of the lesser offence even though he was not expressly charged for
the lesser offence – section 179(2) of
the CPA; section 218(2) of the CPC.
TYPES
OF PUNISHMENTS
These are also known as sentence or penalty. After an
accused person is convicted for an offence, the magistrate or judge must pass a
sentence on him.
The types of punishments are –
1.
Death sentence – section 367 of the CPA.
2.
Imprisonment – section 377 of the CPA.
3.
Fine – section 389 of the CPA.
4.
Caning – section 387 of the CPA.
5.
Haddi lashing – section 307 of the CPC.
6.
Forfeiture – section 359 of the CPC.
DEATH
SENTENCE
The death sentence is the prescribed punishment for
persons convicted of capital offences. It is only a High Court that can pass
such a sentence as capital offences. They are not triable by the Magistrate
Courts.
The death sentence is mandatory, therefore, the court
does not have the discretion to impose any other penalty or a lesser penalty
upon conviction.
When pronouncing a death sentence, the judge is robed
in red gown and black cap. The punishment of death is inflicted by hanging the
offender by the neck till he be dead – section
367 of the CPA, and the sentence is pronounced in this form –
‘The sentence of the court upon you is that you be hanged by the
neck until you be dead and may the Lord have mercy on your soul’. – section 367(2) of the CPA.
It is the duty of the judge under the law to state the
statutory direction as to the manner of death. But where he merely pronounces
it without indicating the manner it is to be carried out, death by hanging
should be presumed as that is the only mode of execution known to the law – Gano
v. The State (1969) 1 NMLR 317. In such a case, the omission is to be
brought to the notice of the judge for rectification. He is not functus officio to correct the error
himself – Dass v. The State (1971) 1 NMLR 304. In Ayodele Adetokunbo v. The State
(1972) 2 SC 26; (1972) 1 All NLR 89, the trial judge after convicting
the appellant for murder merely recorded “sentence of death pronounced”. The
Court of Appeal, on the issue of sentence, thought that the trial judge did not
pronounce the sentence of death in the prescribed form. In a further appeal to
the Supreme Court, it was held that the sentence, as recorded by the trial
judge, was sufficient to infer that he pronounced the sentence of death in the
stipulated terms of the Criminal Procedure Act. The court however, opined that
it was desirable that the sentence as provided for in the Act be recorded
verbatim.
In Kalu v. The State (1998) 11-12 SC 14 at 49;
(1998) 13 NWLR (Pt. 583) 531, the Supreme Court opined that the death
sentence is lawful in Nigeria and cannot be regarded as a degrading or inhuman
treatment.
Where a death sentence is pronounced, the judge who
pronounces it issues under his hand and seal a certificate to the effect that
such a sentence has been pronounced upon the accused named therein and such a certificate
is a sufficient and full authority for the detention of the offender in safe
custody until the sentence can be carried into effect.
EXCEPTIONS
TO THE DEATH SENTENCE
There are two exceptions to death sentence, as it
cannot be passed upon the following persons upon conviction of a capital
offence –
1.
Pregnant women; and
2.
Young persons.
PREGNANT WOMEN
The sentence cannot be passed on a woman found to be
pregnant at the time of conviction but in lieu of it, the woman should be
sentenced to imprisonment for life – section
368(2) of the CPA; sections 270 and 300 of the CPC. Where, therefore, a
woman is convicted of a capital offence alleges that she is pregnant or where
the trial court convicts her thinks fit so to do, the court should, before
passing sentence, first determine the question of whether or not she is
pregnant – section 376(1) of the CPA;
sections 271(1) and 300 of the CPC. The court should find her not pregnant
unless it is satisfactorily and affirmatively proved that she is pregnant – section 376(2) of the CPA; section 271(4)
of the CPC. If she is found not pregnant, the death sentence must be passed
– section 376(3) of the CPA. But an
appeal lies against such a finding and if the appeal court sets it aside, it
will quash the death sentence and substitute therefore a sentence of
imprisonment for life – section 376(4)
of the CPA.
YOUNG PERSONS
The death sentence cannot also be passed on an
offender, who, in the opinion of the court, has not attained the age of
seventeen (17) years. In such a case, the death sentence is not pronounced or
recorded but instead, the offender is ordered to be detained at the pleasure of
the President if the capital offence is against a Federal law or of the
Governor if it is against a State law – section
368(3) of the CPA.
It is the age of the offender at the time of his
conviction and not the age at the time of the offence committed that is
material and determines whether or not the death sentence shall be passed – The
Queen v. Bangaza (1960) 5 FSC 1. The current law is that it is the age
of the young person as at the time the offence was committed and not the age as
at the time of the conviction. The court may form the opinion that the
convicted person has not reached the age of seventeen (17) years from –
1.
The record of the proceedings;
or
2.
Calling evidence as to age; or
3.
Ordering medical examination.
Where the court calls evidence as to age, the
prosecution and the defence may call witness or witnesses. Such witnesses shall
be examined, cross-examined and re-examined by either side, if need be – Jubril
v. The State (1969) NMLR 71.
PREROGATIVE
OF MERCY
Where the court pronounces a sentence of death on an
accused person who is convicted, the court shall as soon as practicable
transmit to the Minister or Commissioner designated to advice the President or
the Governor on the exercise of the prerogative of mercy –
1.
A certified true copy of the
record of proceedings at the trial;
2.
A copy of certificate to the
effect that sentence of death has been pronounced upon the person named in the
certificate; and
3.
A report in writing signed by
him containing recommendations and observations (with respect to the convicted
person and his trial) that he thinks fit to make – section 371(1) of the CPA; section 294(1) of the CPC.
The Minister or Commissioner, as the case may be,
shall consider the report made by the trial court in respect of the convicted
person.
There are Advisory Councils on the Prerogative of
Mercy in each of the States of the federation. In respect of federal offences,
the Council of State is the body responsible for exercising the Prerogative of
Mercy.
The Attorney-General may recommend to the Governor or
President after considering the report of the Advisory Council that –
1.
The sentence should be commuted
to imprisonment for life; or
2.
The sentence should be commuted
to any specific period; or
3.
The convicted person should be
otherwise pardoned or reprieved.
Where the convicted person is not pardoned or
reprieved, the death sentence pronounced upon the convict must be carried into
effect – section 371F of the CPA;
section 298 of the CPC.
It should be noted that the powers of the President
are to be exercised by him after consultation with the Council of State, whilst
the Governor’s power shall be exercised by him after consultation with the
Advisory Council of the State on Prerogative of Mercy.
In Okeke v. The State (2003) 15 NWLR (Pt. 842) 25, the Supreme
Court, in refusing an application for prerogative of mercy, held that –
1.
The recommendation of mercy for
convicted persons are matters within the province of the on the prerogative of
mercy; and
2.
It is to that body that a
convicted person, if he so desires, may direct his application for
consideration.
IMPRISONMENT
A sentence of imprisonment takes effect from and
includes the whole of the day of the date on which it was pronounced. However,
under the CPA, a court may impose a suspended sentence, however, there is no
equivalent provision for suspended sentence under the CPC, in which case the
sentence shall not commence immediately but shall commence on any day not
exceeding 3 months after the date of sentence.
FINE
Sections 282 of
the CPA; and section 23 of the CPC provides for the
power of a court to impose fine in lieu of imprisonment. In Price
Control Board v. Ezeama (1982) 1 NCR 7, it was held that even when the
law creating an offence provides that the accused shall be ‘sentenced without
option of fine’ the court still has discretion to impose a fine. But where a
law provides for the minimum (not maximum) period of imprisonment to be imposed
for the commission of an offence, the court cannot impose fine in lieu of
imprisonment.
CANNING
This may be inflicted on the accused in addition or in
lieu of any other form of punishment – section
388 of the CPA.
The following categories of persons cannot be ordered
to be canned –
1.
Persons above the age of 45
years.
2.
Women.
However, where the accused has filed a notice of
appeal, he cannot be canned until the appeal is heard. And the number of
strokes shall not exceed 12 strokes of the cane.
HADDI
LASHING
This is provided for in only the Northern States – section 307 of the CPC. It can be
inflicted on a Moslem, only where the offender is guilty of any of the
following offences –
1.
Adultery.
2.
Drinking alcohol.
3.
Defamation.
4.
Injurious falsehood.
It is inflicted in an enclosed place and the public is
permitted to watch.
FORFEITURE
This may be imposed in addition to or in lieu of any
other form of penalty prescribed for the offence – section 359 of the CPC.
RESTORATIVE
JUSTICE
This is an alternative delinquency sanction that
focuses on repairing the harm done, meeting the victim’s needs, and holding the
offender responsible for his or her actions.
Restorative justice sanctions use a balanced approach,
producing the least restrictive disposition while stressing the offender’s
accountability and providing relief to the victim. The offender may be ordered
to make restitution, to perform community service, or to make amends in some
other way that the court orders.
By Barr. Chigozie Ezekiel +2348034997413, victorezekielc@yahoo.com
Follow @wingrassnews
By Barr. Chigozie Ezekiel +2348034997413, victorezekielc@yahoo.com
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